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Self-control (SC) is an individual trait defined as the ability to pursue long-distance goals
in spite of the obstacles generated by current desires, innate or learned automatisms,
and physiological needs of an organism. This trait is relatively stable across the life
span and it predicts such important features as level of income, quality of social
relationships, and proneness to addictions. It is widely believed that the cognitive
substrate of SC involves the executive functions (EFs), such as inhibitory control,
shifting of attention, and working memory updating. However, the empirical evidence
concerning the relationships between trait SC and EFs is not convincing. The present
study aims to address two questions: (1) what is the strength of relationships between
trait SC and EFs, and (2) which aspects of SC are predicted by particular EFs, if at
all. In order to answer these questions, we carried out a psychometric study with
296 participants (133 men and 163 women, mean age 23.31, SD 3.64), whom we
investigated with three types of tools: (1) a battery SC scales and inventories, (2)
a battery of EFs tasks, and (3) two general intelligence tests. Structural equation
modeling approach was used to analyze the data. We found that the latent variables
representing SC and the latent variable representing EFs did not show any relationship.
The standardized path coefficient between EFs and general intelligence turned out
rather strong. We conclude that the trait of SC, measured with questionnaires, does
not depend on the strength of cognitive control, measured with EFs tasks.
Keywords: self-control, self-regulation, executive functions, cognitive control, intelligence
INTRODUCTION
Self-control (SC) is a human capability to pursue distant valuable goals in spite of obstacles
produced by situational influences, innate or learned automatisms, and inner impulses caused
by current physiological needs. Traditionally, this phenomenon has been explored within
two research paradigms. Firstly, there are studies publishes by Roy F. Baumeister and his
colleagues, who showed that doing a task that requires effortful control results in transient
reduction of one’s capability to exert SC furthermore (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000).
For instance, watching a movie with an instruction to ignore subtitles appearing at the
bottom of the screen makes a person less able to do higher-order cognitive tasks, such
as cognitive tests (Baumeister et al., 1998). Such studies provided empirical background for
the so-called strength theory of SC, also known as the ‘ego depletion’ theory (Baumeister
et al., 2007; Hagger et al., 2010), according to which self-regulation is a kind of resource
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that can be ‘spent’ on tasks requiring effortful control. The
more is ‘spent’ on a preceding task the less can be ‘spent’ on
the following tasks, unless the resources are renewed during a
recreational break. The ‘ego depletion’ effect, which we suggest to
label with a neutral term ‘the Baumeister effect,’ is now debated
concerning its strength and generality (Lurquin et al., 2016).
Secondly, there are studies published by Mischel (1974) and
his collaborators (Mischel et al., 1989), showing high predictive
value of one’s ability to refuse immediate gratification for the
sake for a much larger but delayed reward. In the so-called
marshmallow paradigm, preschool children were rewarded with
one cake, which they could eat immediately, unless they decided
to wait for the second cake, which – unbeknownst to them –
would be delivered 15 min later. The median waiting time for
the second cake was about 7 min, although some children could
not wait longer than 1 min whereas others could withstand the
whole waiting period. These huge individual differences in the
ability to delay gratification, measured in the preschool period,
appeared highly predictive concerning important aspects of adult
life, such as higher income, better and more stable relationships,
and reduced vulnerability to addictions (Mischel et al., 1988;
Casey et al., 2011).
Recent approaches to SC underline its involvement in the
process of value-based decision-making (Inzlicht and Berkman,
2015; Berkman et al., 2017). The decision to exert SC, or not,
is described as a function of choice, determined by different
values ascribed to potential personal goals. According to this
account, sometimes people are able to delay gratification because
the value of the delayed goal is much higher than the value of
the immediately accessible goal, although the latter looks rather
tempting and may be reached without any effort. In other cases,
people with enough resources to control themselves may decide
that immediate pleasure is more valuable than a long-distance
goal, whose attainment needs time and effort. The ‘Baumeister
effect’ can therefore be accounted for in terms of value weighting
and failures of motivation rather than in terms of depletion of
‘ego resources.’
In this paper, we discuss the problem of cognitive
underpinnings of SC, understood as a relatively stable individual
trait. We assume that such a trait can be assessed with reliable
psychometric tools, and the scores gained by a person with such
tools can be related to other individual traits, such as personality
and intelligence. Next, we assume that the trait of SC is subserved
by specialized cognitive functions, similarly to other individual
traits. For instance, it has been convincingly demonstrated that
general fluid intelligence depends on individual differences in
working memory capacity (e.g., Colom et al., 2004; Chuderski
and Necka, 2012, and the trait of creativity is related to divergent
thinking skills (McCrae, 1987; Baer, 1993). Since stable traits are
hardly susceptible to experimental manipulations, the studies
on cognitive underpinnings of individual differences are mostly
correlational in nature, so the causal explanations are quite
risky. It may be claimed, for example, that capacity of working
memory determines the level of general fluid intelligence or
that the level of general intelligence determines accuracy in
dealing with working memory tasks. The former account is
sometimes referred to as the bottom-up approach (cognitive
functions determine the general trait), whereas the latter one
is called the top-down approach (the general trait determines
cognitive functions). The training studies (e.g., Jaeggi et al.,
2008) showed that enhancement of intelligence may result
from systematic improvement of working memory capacity
(a far transfer effect), which favors the bottom-up stance. The
bottom-up explanations, according to which specific cognitive
functions determine the level of intelligence, rather than the
opposite, are also supported by theoretical considerations (e.g.,
Sternberg, 2008). However, there are serious doubts concerning
the question whether intelligence really can be improved
through training (e.g., Shipstead et al., 2012), so the bottom-
up explanations of intelligence still need stronger empirical
evidence.
As regards the trait of SC, there is a widespread conviction
that it is cognitively subserved by executive functions (EFs).
According to a definition proposed by Akira Miyake and his co-
workers, EFs are ‘. . .general-purpose control mechanisms that
modulate the operation of various cognitive subprocesses and
thereby regulate the dynamics of human cognition’ (Miyake
et al., 2000, p. 50). Various cognitive processes, involved in
reception and storage of information (perception, memory), but
also implicated in manipulation with mental representations
(thinking), need some kind of integration and supervision.
Without such a management, human cognition would get
disintegrated, thus being unable to play its fundamental
function, namely, the control of behavior. In other words,
cognitive processes must be effectively controlled in order
to be able to command our behavior (Diamond, 2013).
Cognitive control seems particularly important in situations
that need overriding automatic behavioral tendencies, since
such situations are very complex, unexpected, or novel. In
such situations, a dominant behavioral tendency must be
suppressed (inhibition), a new pattern of behavior or a new
mental set must be initiated (shifting), and the awareness
concerning the ongoing task must be refreshed (working memory
updating). No wonder, then, that Miyake and co-workers
consider Inhibition, Shifting, and Updating, to be the most
important EFs.
The definition proposed Miyake et al. (2000) declares that
EFs are general-purpose mechanisms, meaning that they should
be implicated in all kinds of cognition. However, they appeared
particularly important for higher-order cognitive processes, such
as thinking and problem solving. Consequently, EFs must be
considered as important determinants of individual differences
in cognition. Indeed, the results of research on intelligence (e.g.,
Ne˛cka, 1998; Chuderski and Ne˛cka, 2010; Cole et al., 2012) and
creativity (e.g., Groborz and Ne˛cka, 2003; Benedek et al., 2014)
support this conclusion. Regarding SC, many authors seem to be
convinced that EFs demonstrate huge individual differences that
subserve individual level of SC (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009, 2012).
For instance, Kotabe and Hofmann (2015, p. 625) maintain that
‘the importance of EFs to SC is clear.’ In the theoretical model
outlined by these authors, individual differences in SC depend,
among other cognitive and motivational factors, on the capacity
to exert control. This capacity is supposed to be measured by tasks
that engage executive control.
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On the one hand, the importance of EFs for SC has been
demonstrated in many studies. For instance, the longitudinal
study carried out by Friedman et al. (2011) showed in that
preschool children who were able to restrain themselves from
immediate gratification demonstrated, as adolescents, higher
level of the common EF factor (closely related to Inhibition)
and Shifting, but not Updating. Young et al. (2009) determined
that behavioral misconduct among adolescents (e.g., substance
abuse) was correlated with lower scores in three EFs tasks:
Stroop, anti-saccade, and stop-signal. People who were able to
delay gratification in the marshmallow experiment at the age of
four showed better performance in the ‘go-no go’ and prepotent
response inhibition tasks at the age of 16–18 (Eigsti et al., 2006).
There are also findings suggesting that criminal and violent
behavior may be related to deficient executive control (Meijers
et al., 2015).
On the other hand, there are studies showing very weak
relationships between EF tasks performance and self-report
measures of behavioral control (Ne˛cka et al., 2012). Duckworth
and Kern (2011) carried out a meta-analytic study (282
samples, 34,564 participants), trying to establish the strength
of relationships between various measures of SC (self-report,
informant report, delay of gratification) and executive control.
The authors found rather weak inter-correlations between
various types of tasks, but also within each type of tasks. For
instance, EF tasks appeared inter-correlated among themselves
at the level of r = 0.14; the average correlations between
EF tasks and other groups of measures appeared weak as
well: r = 0.11 for delay tasks, r = 0.10 for self-reports,
and r = 0.14 for informant reports. Interestingly, average
convergent validity measures appeared much higher for self-
report (r = 0.48) and informant-report (r = 0.54) measures.
These results suggest that both SC and executive control are
highly heterogeneous constructs that need to be assessed with
heterogeneous batteries of tests, scales, or questionnaires. They
also suggest that the category of EF tasks is much more
diversified than the category of self-report and informant-report
measures. Low level of inter-correlations between various EF
tasks may result from their ‘impurity,’ meaning that such tasks
measure not only one specific EF but also other functions,
not to mention a number of other factors, such as general
speed of responding, attentional alertness, susceptibility to
boredom during long experimental sessions, lack of computer
phobia, etc.
In this paper, we attempt to investigate the relationship
between executive control, measured with standard EF tasks,
and SC, measured with both self-report and informant-report
questionnaires. In order to overcome to problem of diversity
and ‘impurity’ of EF tasks, we adopted the structural equation
modeling approach with a relatively large sample of participants.
The SEM approach allows extraction of latent variables that
ignore specificity of various tasks, thus expressing the common
factor that these tasks refer to. Additionally, we included two
general intelligence tests, in order to establish whether possible
relationships between SC and EFs would be moderated by the
general mental ability, which is implicated in executive control
as well.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We investigated 296 participants recruited via two social media
networks. There were 133 men and 163 women in the sample.
Their mean age was 23.31 years (SD = 3.64). All participants
were from outside of the Psychology Department. Participants
obtained 60 PLN (ca. 15 €) for 4 h of testing, including a 15-min
refreshment break.
Ethics Statement
The committee for ethics in studies involving human
participants, assigned by the Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian
University in Krakow, approved this study on the basis of
extended description of methods, materials, and procedure.
According to the Helsinki declaration, participants signed
written informed consent forms.
Self-Control Measures
NAS-50
This is a self-report questionnaire of SC developed by us (Ne˛cka
et al., 2016). It consists of 50 items divided into five subscales:
Initiative and Persistence (IP), Proactive Control (PC), Switching
and Flexibility (SF), Inhibition and Adjournment (IA), and
Goal Maintenance (GM). This tool has been subjected to the
validation study with 934 participants (see: Ne˛cka et al., 2016).
Its reliability was assessed with internal consistency measures
(Cronbach’s α = 0.86) and test/retest approach (intraclass
correlation coefficient ICC = 0.94). The validation study revealed
that five subscales correlated with the NAS-50 general score at the
moderate or high level (+0.47 < r < +0.70, depending on the
subscale). The general score turned out strongly associated with
Baumeister’s (see: Tangney et al., 2004) SC Scale (r = 0.77). Also,
the Conscientiousness dimension of the Big Five model predicted
the NAS-50 general score (r = 0.54). So, the convergent validity
of NAS-50 seems suitable. As to divergent validity, this measure
appeared completely independent of general mental ability scores
(see: Ne˛cka et al., 2016, for details).
NAS-40
This is a mutation of NAS-50 prepared for the informant report
studies. We removed 10 items from the original version (NAS-
50), due to their overly introspective content that would make
them difficult to use by informants. The remaining 40 items
were converted into the third person grammatical version (e.g.,
‘He/she is usually not late for meetings’ instead ‘I’m usually not
late for meetings’). In this way, NAS-40 became possible to fill in
by somebody who knows the participant proper (a colleague, a
teacher, etc.). The reliability measures of NAS-40 turned out to be
satisfactory (α = 0.84, ICC = 0.92).
Self-Control Scale (SCS)
The Self-Control Scale (SCS), developed by Tangney et al. (2004),
is a self-report questionnaire consisting of 36 items. The authors
report good reliability characteristics (Cronbach’s α = 0.89, test–
retest reliability = 0.89).
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Conscientiousness (C)
We administered the NEO-FFI questionnaire (Costa and
McCrae, 1992) in the Polish adaptation (Zawadzki et al., 1998).
This tool was important for its Conscientiousness scale, since
description of this personality dimension pertains to some
aspects of SC, understood as an individual trait.
Executive Control Tasks
We administered a battery of five computerized EF tasks that
were supposed to engage three major EFs: Inhibition, Shifting,
and Updating (Miyake et al., 2000). For Inhibition, we selected
the Stop signal task. For Shifting, we chose the CATT procedure,
already used in some studies of ours (Ne˛cka et al., 2012).
For Updating, we decided on the n-back procedure, which
requires constant refreshment of the content of working memory.
Additionally, this specific version of n-back requires that false
signals (a.k.a. ‘lures’) be ignored, so this task allows assessment
of the Inhibition function as well. The second task engaging
the function of Updating is called COUNT, since it requires
mental counting of sequentially presented stimuli up to their
third appearance and again from the beginning. Furthermore, we
administered the Stroop task, although it is hard to decide which
specific EF this task refers to. However, in spite of its ‘impurity’
it is widely used in the cognitive control research as an example
of the category of interference resolution tasks (Chuderski et al.,
2012). It is supposed to capture the Inhibition function as well
(Miyake et al., 2000). All these tasks have been already used in
many studies carried out in our lab (e.g., Chuderski and Ne˛cka,
2010; Chuderski and Necka, 2012; Chuderski et al., 2012; Ne˛cka
et al., 2012). Ideally, it would be advisable to have at least two
tasks engaging each EF, and this was our initial plan. However,
we could not find an acceptable version of a second task that
would involve the function of Shifting, so we decided to use only
the CATT procedure. The function of Updating is represented
by two tasks: COUNT and n-back, the latter being important
in reference to signal detection only. The function of Inhibition
is represented by Stop-Signal, Stroop, and n-back again, the
latter being important as far as inhibition of distracting lures is
concerned.
Stop Signal
Participants performed the stop signal task (Logan, 1994)
modified by Verbruggen et al. (2008). Pictures of an arrow
heading left or right served as the visual stimuli in this version
of SST. Participants were asked to press left or right arrow
keys according to direction of the arrow on the screen. These
go stimuli were presented randomly one at a time, each with
50% probability. Participants were supposed to be as fast and
correct as possible unless an auditory stop signal was presented
over the headphones. In this case they were instructed to stop
the response. After successful inhibition, the interval between
go and stop stimuli became 50 ms longer, after unsuccessful
inhibition the interval became 50 ms shorter (minimum 50 ms,
maximum 1150 ms). The stop-signal delay (SSD) was set to
250 ms at the start of each experimental block. This task allows
calculation the SSRT (stop signal reaction time), according to
the following rationale: SSRT is the time elapsing between the
signal of stop and the internal (i.e., mental) reaction to this
signal. If there is a.50 probability of responding in spite of the
stop signal, time of the unobserved internal response to the
signal of stop must be equal to the mean reaction time for
go responses. Since SSD is adjusted on the basis of accuracy
observed in the recent trial, the probability of responding in
spite of the signal of stop must be 0.50. Therefore, SSRT is
calculated as the difference between mean RT and adjusted
SSD (see: Verbruggen et al., 2008). The shorter (faster) the
SSRT the better is one’s ability to inhibit the unnecessary
response.
N-Back
We used the figural version of the n-back task, the same as in
Experiment 5 reported by Chuderski and Necka (2012). The task
consisted in serial presentation of simple figural symbols, such a
star, a triangle, an arrow etc., each approximately 2.5 cm× 2.5 cm
in size. Stimuli remained at the screen for 1500 ms and were
masked for 300 ms. The task consisted of four series. In every
series we presented 88 stimuli, so altogether there were 352
stimuli showed to each participant, plus some training stimuli
before each series. Sixteen out of 88 stimuli in every series
were presented twice. The participants were supposed to decide
whether the second presentation took place n elements after
the first one. The predefined n number equaled two. Hence,
participants were instructed to press a space bar if and only if
the currently presented symbol had already appeared two items
back. For instance, if a symbol reappeared in the stream of
stimuli separated by just one other symbol (e.g., star, triangle,
star again) this repeated symbol became a target that required
detection and speedy response with the space bar. If an item
reappeared too early, i.e., immediately after its first presentation,
or too late, i.e., separated by two symbols instead of just one, it
was to be ignored. Stimuli reappearing too early (n = 1) or too
late (n = 3) were classified as ‘lures,’ since their function was
to ‘tempt’ participants to respond with no required accuracy.
There were eight targets, four n = 1 lures, and four n = 3
lures in every series. Majority of stimuli (72 in every series)
did not reappear shortly after their first presentation. These
stimuli may be termed “noise,” since they were to be ignored. If
a participant responded to such stimuli, he/she committed the
error of false alarm. Also, if a participant pressed the space bar
in response to the stimuli that reappeared at “wrong” positions,
i.e., n = 1 or n = 3, he/she earned the error of lure detection.
We registered accuracy scores for each participant, defined as
the proportion of correct signal detections and the proportion
of erroneous lure detection. We also registered reaction time of
every response.
COUNT
This task was based on the mental counters procedure (Larson,
1986). Participants were presented with a sequence of randomly
repeated figures: triangle, circle or square. They were supposed
to count how many times each figure has already appeared. If
the currently displayed figure appeared for the third time in the
sequence, the participants had to press space key. Additionally,
the third appearance of any figure meant that counting of this
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particular type of stimulus should start from the beginning.
In this way, the participants had to keep in mind and update
three ‘stacks’ of elements (i.e., figures). Auditory feedback took
place after each erroneous reaction or lack of reaction for
the third presentation of any figure. There were 45 instances
of the third repetition (15 for each figure). The program
registered the number of misses (lack of notification of the third
repetition), the number of other errors, and the mean response
time.
CATT
This task allows the analysis of controlled switching of attention
and its logic was borrowed from Meiran (1996). Participants
were presented with separate digits, which appeared at the screen
for 3 s or until the response was made. They were instructed
either to categorize the digits into odd (left key) and even (right
key) or to categorize them into smaller than five (left key) and
bigger than five (right key). Of course, the digit “5” had to be
removed from the set of stimuli. Given that the task required
double categorization, the participants were provided with cues
that indicated which task they should fulfill in the upcoming trial.
The cues were just single words followed by a question mark,
i.e., “EVEN?” or “SMALLER?”, and they appeared 500 ms before
the stimulus proper. Participants were trained first in the correct
use of instructions, response keys, and cues (20 trials, 1000 ms
for a cue). Then, they were asked to perform a series of 148
trials, which were arranged randomly in sequence in relation
to repeat and switch conditions. Participants had 3000 ms to
respond (4000 ms in the training phase). Each digit that served as
a stimulus was masked for 500 ms (1000 ms in the training phase).
We registered the reaction time of correct responses as well as
misses and false alarms. Participants were asked to be accurate
rather than quick.
Stroop
We used the numerical version of the Stroop task, which required
counting digits and ignoring their meaning (Fox et al., 1971;
Chuderski et al., 2012). The screen showed three, four, five, or six
exemplars of a digit drawn from the set [3, 4, 5, 6]. Each digit
was 0.6 cm × 0.8 cm in size. In congruent trials, the number
of stimuli was in concord with the digits to be counted (e.g.,
four exemplars of the digit ‘4’). In incongruent trials, the former
and the latter differed (e.g., five exemplars of the digit ‘4’). Trials
lasted 3 s or until response was given. There was also a neutral
condition, in which participants were supposed to respond to the
number of stimuli not being digits. The instruction was to avoid
reading a digit and to press a response key that was assigned
to a presented number of stimuli. There were 60 congruent, 60
incongruent, and 60 neutral stimuli altogether. Accuracy and
latency of each response was registered. Dependent variables
(DVs) were as follows: the number of correct responses in each
condition and the average response time in each condition.
Intelligence Tests
Raven
In order to assess their level of fluid intelligence, participants were
given Raven’s Progressive Matrices Advanced Version (Raven
et al., 1983) in the paper-and-pencil form. This test consists of
36 items that include a three-by-three matrix of figural patterns.
The bottom-left pattern is always missing. A testee is supposed
to fill in this blank space with the correct pattern, which he/she
can choose from eight response options provided at the bottom
of the sheet. This test is regarded a good estimation of general
fluid intelligence since it requires grasping the abstract rules that
govern the composition of the matrix and to apply this rule while
choosing the accurate response. The pilot study showed that the
whole procedure was too long and tiresome for participants;
therefore, only the even items from RAPM were administered,
which did not worsen the reliability of assessment.
Analogies (TAO)
We also administered another paper-and-pencil test of fluid
reasoning, which requires understanding and using the relations
of analogy. Jarosław Orzechowski and Adam Chuderski have
designed this analogical reasoning test in our lab. It has been used
in several published studies (e.g., Chuderski and Necka, 2012;
Chuderski et al., 2012). The test includes 36 figural analogies in
the form ‘A is to B as C is to X,’ where A, B, and C are types of
relatively simple patterns of figures, A is related to B according
to two, three, four, or five latent rules (e.g., symmetry, rotation,
change in size, color, thickness, number of objects, etc.), and X is
an empty space. The task is to choose one figure out of four choice
alternatives that relates to figure C, as B relates to A. Again, only
the even items of TAO were administered.
Procedure
Participants were invited to the lab in pairs. In the ads that
advertised participation in this study, we put the precondition
that two people are welcome together if they know each other for
at least 6 months. This requirement was important, since every
participant was supposed to fill in all self-report questionnaires
plus one informant-report tool (i.e., NAS-40), pertaining to
the colleague he/she appeared with. After reporting to the lab,
participants filled in the conscious consent form, and next they
started to do the proper tasks in the following sequence: NAS-50,
NAS-40, SCS, CATT, Count, n-back, Stroop, Stop signal, NEO-
FFI, Raven, TAO. In the middle of the procedure, which took ca.
4 h altogether, participants had a 15-min break when they could
have snacks and soft drinks.
RESULTS
In Table 1 we report basic descriptive statistics. Since every
computerized EF task yielded several indices, such as latencies
and (in)accuracy measures for different series or level of difficulty,
we do not report all possible measurement outcomes. Only the
DVs that entered into further structural modeling are displayed
in Table 1. These data pertaining to range and standard deviation
suggest that there were huge inter-individual differences among
participants, which make further correlational and structural
analyses acceptable.
Table 2 shows the first-order correlation coefficients
pertaining to the formerly described variables. Since some
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Statistic Standard error
Age 18.00 43.00 23.35 0.21 3.64
NAS-50 105.00 225.00 165.15 1.17 20.04
NAS-40 85.00 180.00 136.42 1.01 17.45
S-C Scale 65.00 164.00 110.71 1.02 17.57
C (NEO-FFI) 11.00 52.00 32.96 0.46 7.89
TAO 0.00 18.00 13.93 0.18 3.07
RAPM 1.00 23.00 16.16 0.22 3.76
CATT (errors) 0.00 99.00 12.32 1.00 17.28
COUNT (errors) 0.00 33.00 11.56 0.42 7.20
SST (Ssrt) 130.16 477.85 246.73 2.72 46.86
N-BACK (correct) 6.00 24.00 17.72 0.22 3.84
N-BACK (lures) 0.00 21.00 4.04 0.22 3.72
NAS-50, Self-control questionnaire, self-report version (Ne˛cka et al., 2016). NAS-40, Self-control questionnaire, informant version (Ne˛cka et al., 2016). SCS, Self-Control
Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). C (NEO-FFI), Conscientiousness from the NEO-FFI questionnaire. TAO, Analogical Reasoning Test. RAPM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive
Matrices. CATT (errors), Task switching, DV – the overall number of errors. COUNT (errors), Mental counters procedure, DV – the overall number of errors. SST (ssrt),
Stop signal task, DV – stop signal reaction time. N-BACK (correct), Figural n-back task, DV – number of correct responses (n = 2). N-BACK (lures), Figural n-back task,
DV – number of erroneous responses to lures (n = 1 or n = 3).
TABLE 2 | Zero-order correlation coefficients between the indices of self-control (NAS-50, NAS-40, SCS, C), general fluid intelligence (TAO, RAPM), and executive
functions (CATT, COUNT, SST, N-BACK correct, N-BACK lures).
Variable NAS-40 SCS C NEO-FFI TAO RAPM CATT
(Errors)
COUNT
(Errors)
SST (Ssrt) N-BACK
(Correct)
N-BACK
(Lures)
NAS-50 0.290∗∗ 0.759∗∗ 0.726∗∗ −0.020 0.038 −0.010 0.041 0.013 0.022 0.042
NAS-40 0.303∗∗ 0.285∗∗ 0.078 0.096 −0.128∗ −0.044 −0.061 0.026 −0.097
SCS 0.682∗∗ −0.024 0.022 −0.031 −0.009 −0.079 0.065 −0.030
C NEO-FFI −0.097 −0.044 0.027 0.115∗ −0.071 −0.063 0.021
TAO 0.551∗∗ −0.302∗∗ −0.247∗∗ −0.202∗∗ 0.310∗∗ −0.235∗∗
RAPM −0.270∗∗ −0.275∗∗ −0.116∗ 0.311∗∗ −0.27∗∗
CATT (errors) 0.233∗∗ 0.145∗∗ −0.354∗∗ 0.142∗
COUNT (errors) 0.069 −0.311∗∗ 0.158∗∗
SST (Ssrt) −0.160∗∗ 0.113
p = 0.051
N-BACK (correct) −0.255∗∗
NAS-50, Self-control questionnaire, self-report version (Ne˛cka et al., 2016). NAS-40, Self-control questionnaire, informant version (Ne˛cka et al., 2016). SCS, Self-Control
Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). C (NEO-FFI), Conscientiousness from the NEO-FFI questionnaire. TAO, Analogical Reasoning Test. RAPM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive
Matrices. CATT (errors), Task switching, DV – the overall number of errors. COUNT (errors), Mental counters procedure, DV – the overall number of errors. SST (ssrt),
Stop signal task, DV – stop signal reaction time. N-BACK (correct), Figural n-back task, DV – number of correct responses (n = 2). N-BACK (lures), Figural n-back task,
DV – number of erroneous responses to lures (n = 1 or n = 3). ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed). ∗∗p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
DVs were not distributed according to the Gaussian curve,
they were log-transformed before entering the correlational
procedures. We can see that there are strong inter-correlations
between various indices of psychometric SC. In particular, the
NAS-50 total score turned out highly correlated with SC Scale
(r = 0.759), and with the Conscientiousness scale from the
NEO-FFI questionnaire (r = 0.726). The informant version of
our scale (NAS-40) shows much weaker, albeit positive and
significant correlations with self-report tools (0.290 < r < 0.303,
depending on the scale). It seems that assessment provided by
peers reveals somewhat different aspects of SC than assessment
based on one’s own judgment. Table 2 also shows that two
tests of general fluid intelligence are correlated at the r = 0.551
level, which is a result comparable to what has been observed
in other studies suing these tools (e.g., Chuderski and Necka,
2012). In contrast to the above-mentioned relationships, the
correlation coefficients pertaining to different measures of EFs
turned out rather weak, although statistically significant. Some of
these correlation coefficients are positive and some are negative
because of the nature of dependent variables (the number of
errors versus the number of correct responses). Therefore,
the absolute value of these coefficients should be taken into
account as the strength of relationships. The absolute values
oscillate between r = 0.069 (n.s.) and r = 0.354 (p < 0.01).
Once again, the mutual relationships between various aspects
of executive control appeared not very strong (compare:
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Duckworth and Kern, 2011; Ne˛cka et al., 2012). Notably, the
absolute values of correlation coefficients between psychometric
SC and EFs oscillate between r = 0.009 (n.s.) and r = 0.128
(p < 0.05), and only two of them, out of twenty, surpassed the
p-level of 0.05.
In the next step of data analysis, we tested structural models
that were supposed to capture the relationships between latent
variables. The relationships between SC, fluid intelligence, and
EFs were tested by means of latent variable modeling with IBM
SPSS Statistics Amos v. 24, using maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation method. The latent variable SC was defined by the
following measures: NAS50, NAS40, SC Scale and C (NEO-FFI).
The latent variable executive functioning was defined by five
measures stemming from four tasks: total number of errors for
the CATT task, total number of errors for the COUNT task, stop-
signal reaction time (SSRT) obtained from the Stop-Signal task,
and two measures from the n-back task: the number of correct
responses for N2 condition and the number of lures for N1 and
N3 conditions. Note that all indicators except of the number
of correct responses for N2 condition were reversed: they were
either errors or response latencies. Therefore, their higher values
indicate lower performance, thus justifying negative signs of
relationships reported in Figures 1, 2. Finally, the latent variable
Fluid intelligence was defined by two tasks: TAO and RAMP. It
must be underscored that the interference effect from the Stroop
task, computed as the proportion of RT in the incongruent and
congruent conditions, did not contribute to this latent variable,
since the loading was as low as 0.11. Other DVs obtained from
the Stroop task (e.g., latencies, error rates) did not contribute
anything, either. For these reasons, we excluded the Stroop
task indices from further analyzes, although some models that
included Stroop showed acceptable fit.
In the first model, SC was regressed on executive
functioning. No error correlations were specified. The analysis
revealed evidence for moderate non-normality (skew < 2.7,
kurtosis < 7.1) for some measures. This model showed an
acceptable model fit: χ2(26) = 34.301, p = 0.128; CFI = 0.987,
RMSEA = 0.033 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.060). Figure 1 displays the
standardized path coefficients of this model. Note that the fit of
the measurement model of SC was satisfactory: χ2(2) = 0.766,
p = 0.682; CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = 0.00 (90% CI: 0.00, 0.087).
Similarly, the fit of the measurement model of executive
functioning was very good: χ2(2) = 1.067, p = 0.586; CFI = 1.000,
RMSEA = 0.00 (90% CI: 0.00, 0.096).
In the next step, both SC and fluid intelligence were regressed
on executive functioning (see Figure 2). Again, no error
correlations were specified. This model confirmed that executive
functioning did not predict SC (β = 0.003, n.s.). By contrast, it
strongly predicted fluid intelligence (β = −0.74, p < 0.001). The
correlation between SC and fluid intelligence was set free because
zero-order correlation coefficients between SC and intelligence
measures turned our very weak (see Table 2). The fit of this
model was also very good: χ2(42) = 50.20, p = 0.180; CFI = 0.990,
RMSEA = 0.026 (90% CI: 0.00, 0.049). Figure 2 shows the
standardized path coefficients of this model.
We report only the models that obtained acceptable fit indices.
Alternative models, built with other DVs, did not fit properly with
the data. In particular, models in which the Stroop task was taken
into account turned out unacceptable.
DISCUSSION
In order to examine the significance of EFs for the trait of SC
in adult healthy volunteers, we investigated 296 people with
the battery of five EF tasks and three psychometric measures
of SC. We also added two general fluid intelligence tests (Gf)
with the intention to check whether potential relationships
between SC and EF would be affected in some way (i.e.,
strengthened, weakened, mediated) by Gf. In the structural
FIGURE 1 | The structural equation model linking executive functions with self-control.
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FIGURE 2 | The structural equation model linking executive functions with intelligence and self-control.
equation modeling approach, we extracted three latent variables,
representing executive control, behavioral control, and general
fluid intelligence. We found that the EF—SC relationship was
non-existent, whereas the EF—Gf relationship turned out quite
strong. No relationship between SC and intelligence became
evident.
Lack of relationship between the latent variables representing
executive control, measured with EF tasks, and psychometric SC,
measured with questionnaires, is probably the most important
finding of this study. On the one hand, it might be regarded
unexpected taking into account the widespread conviction about
the importance of EFs for effective control of behavior (e.g.,
Hofmann et al., 2009, 2012; Diamond and Lee, 2011; Kotabe and
Hofmann, 2015). According to this stance, EFs play a crucial
role in determination of the efficacy of behavioral SC, being its
cognitive substructure. On the other hand, our findings should
not be surprising in the context of other studies reporting rather
weak relationships of executive control tasks with self-reported
measures of behavioral control (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2006; Ne˛cka
et al., 2012). The meta-analysis performed by Duckworth and
Kern (2011) seems particular interesting from this point of view
because the authors found that the average correlation coefficient
between these two types of measures, obtained after examining
282 studies, was as low as r = 0.10. What is a tenable explanation
of these discrepancies, then?
To begin with, there is a possibility that SC is a personality
trait rather than a cognitive ability. Personality traits are believed
to be independent of both general intelligence and particular
lower-order abilities constituting the g factor, although there
are arguments that change of research paradigms might reveal
still unknown relationships (Ackerman, 2018). According to
the mainstream of the personality research, major personality
dimensions should be regarded orthogonal to mental abilities.
Apart from the existing body of evidence (e.g., McCrae and Costa,
1987; Ackerman and Heggestad, 1997), this conviction may be
supported by theoretical arguments. For instance, personality
traits are usually bipolar in nature (e.g., extraversion versus
introversion) and none of their poles are regarded ‘better’ or
‘worse’ as such. Rather, being close to one of the extremes
may help in specific tasks, situations, or job requirements:
extraverts usually do better as salespersons although introverts
may prevail in laboratory job (Barrick and Mount, 1991).
Intellectual traits work in a different manner, since it is usually
beneficial for a person to demonstrate high rather than low
level of cognitive abilities. General intelligence seems particularly
helpful because it contributes to performance in all cognitive
tasks. Another argument pertains to the distinction between
typical and maximal performance (Goff and Ackerman, 1992).
Personality traits shape human behavior in typical, repetitive,
everyday situations, whereas intellectual traits determine human
performance in very specific situations, such as exams or test
taking sessions, in which a person attempts to obtain the
best possible result. IQ scores predict real-life achievements
with limited precision because of this gap between typical and
maximal performance. Standard personality assessment tools
(i.e., questionnaires) include items referring to typical everyday
situations, whereas standard intellectual tests consist of cognitive
tasks that require the highest possible engagement.
If this line of reasoning is sound, we should treat the trait
of SC as a dimension belonging to the realm of personality
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rather than to the category of cognitive abilities. Specifically,
this trait probably does not work according to ‘the more the
better’ principle, which is characteristic of intellectual abilities.
It would be fascinating to reveal possible dark sides of high
level of behavioral SC, since over-control may cause a number
of problems in social adjustment and personal satisfaction, such
as inflexibility or obsessive-compulsive behavior. Anyway, the
trait of SC may not need any cognitive functions underlying its
mode of functioning. Consequently, it should not enter in any
relationship with executive control, measured with EF tasks.
So, it is possible that the trait of SC does not need any
underlying cognitive functions but it is also possible that it
needs functions that were not investigated in our study. We
based this investigation on the Miyake et al. (2000) model of
EFs, for its widespread acceptance and popularity. However, this
model lacks some EFs that might be important for SC, mostly
for its proactive aspects. Careful planning of behavior, including
creation a schedule of goals and actions, is undoubtedly an
important facet of SC. But planning is rarely taken into account
in EF studies, except of some clinical studies in which Shallice
(1982) Tower of London (ToL) task is adopted (Mihalec et al.,
2017). Although ToL engages short-term planning of actions,
which tends to be impaired in the frontal lobe patients, as well as
in PD and AD patients, it does not engage the processes involved
in long term planning performed by healthy people during their
goal-oriented activities. Another EF function that is absent in the
Miyake et al. (2000) model pertains to goal maintenance. Inability
to remember what is the goal of one’s currently performed
action results in chaotic behavior and overly dependence on
environmental influences, at the expense of behavior triggered by
endogenous decisions. On the contrary, the ability to maintain
the goals allows efficient control of actions. Had we included
the goal maintenance function into the battery of EF tasks, we
might be able to obtain a bit stronger relationships between
executive control and behavioral control. Inclusion of updating
tasks did not help to resolve this problem because such tasks
pertain to short-term updating of the content of working memory
rather that long-term keeping in mind personal goals, particularly
their hierarchy of importance and time scheduling. Tasks that
would be able to engage long-term processes of planning and goal
maintenance are still lacking in the standard list of EF procedures,
although they seem to be of utmost necessity.
It is also possible that the trait of SC needs EFs, including
the ones that were investigated in our study, but we were unable
to unveil such relationships due to psychometric reasons. The
EF tasks have been designed not for psychometric purposes but
for investigation of the general aspects of cognition. Therefore,
their psychometric properties are quite low, particularly in
reference to stability of measurement. These tasks are also very
narrow in scope, meaning that each of them engages a very
specific process or function, such as disengagement of attention
(the flanker task) or conflict resolution (the Stroop task). For
psychometric purposes, the EF tasks should be much broader
in scope. Moreover, the existing EF tasks are characterized
by large amount of specific variance resulting from specificity
of stimuli, procedure, implementation, equipment, instructions,
etc. There is no standard rule of construction the EF tasks
and their implementation for particular study. Being aware
of this problem, we deliberately designed the study in the
manner that allowed construction of latent variables, which were
supposed to go beyond specificity of various tasks and capture
the common variance pertaining to all tasks. To some extent,
we succeeded because the latent variable representing executive
control demonstrated quite strong relationship with the latent
variable representing general fluid intelligence. From this point
of view, lack of relationship between EF and the trait of SC turns
out to be significant. If the standardized path coefficient between
EF and Gf is rather strong, and the analogical coefficient between
EF and SC is non-existent, then this ‘negative’ result probably
supports the stance according to which SC in adult healthy people
does not depend on the strength of executive control. Still, this
conclusion must be supplemented with the caveat that different
set of EF tasks might have resulted in quite different pattern of
relationships between the latent variables.
Another explanation of the lack of any EF—SC relationship
pertains to the characteristics of the sample. We investigated
healthy adult volunteers who demonstrated the wide range of the
trait of SC, whereas studies demonstrating the existence of the
EF—SC relation were typically run with special populations, such
as incarcerated violent offenders (Seruca and Silva, 2016; Meijers
et al., 2017). Still, the relationships reported are rather weak. For
instance, Meijers et al. (2017) investigated 130 prisoners with
a neuropsychological battery suitable to assess such functions
as response inhibition, planning, attention, shifting, working
memory, and impulsivity. They found only one significant
difference between violent and non-violent offenders, which
referred to response inhibition (partial correlation r = 0.205).
They also report a weak relationship between recidivism and
planning (r = 0.209). As we can see, some EFs may demonstrate
predictive value for SC when the latter is really weak. If the whole
range of SC variance is taken into account, such relationships –
being generally scarce and weak – disappear. Interestingly, the
evidence demonstrating the predictive value of SC for various
aspects of life success pertains mostly to low level of this trait,
so to speak – to lack of SC. For instance, the results reported
by Moffitt et al. (2011) show that it is the low level of SC that
predicts such teenage problems as smoking, school absenteeism,
or unplanned parenthood. Their participants were divided into
quintiles according the informant-based ratings of SC. The first
quintile differed substantially from the rest of participants, while
the fifth quintile – representing to highest level of SC – did
not contribute much as to prediction of behavioral conduct or
misconduct. It is possible, then, that SC is important for life
success in the sense that lack of it predicts many problems but
its high level of development does not have predictive value
anymore. In other words, there may be a threshold principle
involved in this relationship: the trait of SC might be important
up to some specific value (threshold), above which it loses
significance as a predictor of life success.
Finally, there is a possibility that self-report measures do not
provide exact estimation of the individual capacity to control
one’s behavior. Consequently, they should be replaced with
some more objective measures, such as informant reports (e.g.,
Moffitt et al., 2011) or specially devised experimental tasks
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(e.g., Steimke et al., 2016). SC is a highly valued personal
trait, therefore the social desirability factor is likely to influence
the way in which people approach particular items in self-
report questionnaires. Deliberate decision to present oneself in
a positive way is probably not very likely in procedures that
assure full anonymity, as was the case of the present study. Still,
at least some participants could choose to present themselves
as more ‘organized’ and ‘reliable’ than they know is the case
in reality. Moreover, the results could be biased not only due
to conscious decisions to boost the questionnaire results but
also because of reduced awareness one’s own personal traits.
We simply may not know how much control do we have
over our own cognitive control (Ne˛cka et al., 2012), therefore,
our questionnaire responses may not reveal the real state of
affairs. However, this kind of bias seems unlikely to act in
just one direction, namely, toward the unrealistically high level
of assessment. If people are not aware how much control
do they have, they may either overestimate or underestimate
their capability of behavioral control. In consequence, the
overall results should not be systematically heightened, although
reliability of assessment is likely to suffer. To prevent this
threat, items of our questionnaires did not require general
knowledge about one’s trait but only some level of awareness
concerning specific situations. For instance, we did not ask
‘Do you think you are a self-controlling person?’. Rather, we
attempted to ask, for instance, about being late for meetings or
doing deadlines. Additionally, we supplemented the battery of
SC tools with the informant-based questionnaire NAS-40. Still,
there is a possibility that the battery of tools supposed to assess
the trait of SC suffered from subjectivity and bias toward social
desirability.
This study suffers from some limitations that make the final
conclusions questionable. Firstly, the number and variety of
EFs tasks should be increased. EFs responsible for planning
and goal maintenance seem particularly important for SC but
they are mostly missing in experimental studies, including
ours. Working memory updating tasks appear to involve short-
term goal maintenance, but not planning. Secondly, assessment
of SC should be made more objective, for instance through
application of observational scales referring to participants’
behavioral characteristics (e.g., Moffitt et al., 2011). We used the
informant version of the SC questionnaire, which undoubtedly
helped to improve objectivity of assessment, but this solution
is far from perfect, mostly because of limited knowledge the
informants may have concerning the ‘real’ level of SC represented
by the participants proper. The objective measures of SC are
rather difficult to employ because of the very nature of SC, which
seems to be a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted phenomenon.
Self-report questionnaires, in spite of all their limitations, have
a fundamental advantage: they allow holistic and generalized
assessment that goes beyond specific situations and specific
impairments. Still, a balanced combination of self-reported and
objective sources of knowledge should be adopted in further
studies. Finally, our sample of participants, albeit quite large, was
probably not diversified enough concerning age, socio-economic
status, and the general level of the trait of SC. In particular,
we lacked participants who would suffer from mild, sub-clinical
impairments of SC. Maybe the relationship we were not able to
find takes place only as far as such people are concerned.
CONCLUSION
While planning this study, we assumed that at least weak
relationships between the trait of SC and efficiency of
executive control would turn out significant. Former studies
were conducted with smaller samples and usually without
latent variable modeling. Since latent variables go beyond
specific variance produced by particular measurement tasks and
procedures, thus capturing ‘the essence’ of the constructs of
interest, such modeling seemed much more promising than
regular correlational approach. So far, the hypothesis that EFs
constitute the cognitive substrate of the trait of SC must be
rejected. In its strong version, our take-home message would
sound like the following: EFs are not significant for SC, probably
because they belong to the realm of abilities whereas the latter is
a part the personality domain. In a weak and humble version, the
message is that we were not able to prove such a relationship.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
EN designed the study and drafted the manuscript. AG helped
to prepare the materials, performed all major statistical analyses,
and helped to prepare the final version of the manuscript. JO
helped to prepare the materials and improved the final version
of the manuscript. MN and NW helped to prepare the materials,
participated in the data gathering, and helped to prepare the final
version of the manuscript.
FUNDING
This paper has been prepared thanks to the support from the
Polish National Centre of Science (NCN), Grant No. DEC-
2013/08/A/HS6/00045.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Olivia Kłodzin´ska for her cooperation
in the process of data gathering.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, P. L. (2018). The search for personality-intelligence relations:
methodological and conceptual issues. J. Intell. 6:2. doi: 10.3390/
jintelligence6010002
Ackerman, P. L., and Heggestad, E. D. (1997). Intelligence, personality, and
interests: evidence for overlapping traits. Psychol. Bull. 121, 219–245. doi: 10.
1037/0033-2909.121.2.219
Baer, J. (1993). Creativity and Divergent Thinking: A Task-Specific Approach.
New York, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 July 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1139
fpsyg-09-01139 July 5, 2018 Time: 19:55 # 11
Ne˛cka et al. Self-Control and Executive Functions
Barrick, M. R., and Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and
job performance: a meta-analysis. Pers. Psychol. 44, 1–26. doi: 10.1111/j.1744-
6570.1991.tb00688.x
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., and Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego
depletion: is the active self a limited resource? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74, 1252–
1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K., and Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-
control. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 351–355. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.
00534.x
Benedek, M., Jauk, E., Sommer, M., Arendasy, M., and Neubauer, A. C. (2014).
Intelligence, creativity, and cognitive control: the common and differential
involvement of executive functions in intelligence and creativity. Intelligence
46, 73–83. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2014.05.007
Berkman, E. T., Hutcherson, C. A., Livingston, J. L., Kahn, L. E., and Inzlicht, M.
(2017). Self-control as value-based choice. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 26, 422–428.
doi: 10.1177/0963721417704394
Casey, B. J., Somerville, L. H., Gotlib, I. H., Ayduk, O., Franklin, N. T., Askren,
M. K., et al. (2011). Behavioral and neural correlates of delay of gratification 40
years later. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 14998–15003. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1108561108
Chuderski, A., and Ne˛cka, E. (2010). “Intelligence and cognitive control,” in
Individual Differences in Cognition: Attention, Memory, and Executive Control,
eds W. A. Gruszka, G. Matthews, and B. Szymura (New York, NY: Springer),
263–282.
Chuderski, A., and Necka, E. (2012). The contribution of working memory to fluid
reasoning: capacity, control, or both? J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 38,
1689–1710. doi: 10.1037/a0028465
Chuderski, A., Taraday, M., Ne˛cka, E., and Smolen´, T. (2012). Storage capacity
explains fluid intelligence but executive control does not. Intelligence 40, 278–
295. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2012.02.010
Cole, M. W., Yarkoni, T., Repovš, G., Anticevic, A., and Braver, T. S.
(2012). Global connectivity of prefrontal cortex predicts cognitive control
and intelligence. J. Neurosci. 32, 8988–8999. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0536-
12.2012
Colom, R., Rebollo, I., Palacios, A., Juan-Espinosa, M., and Kyllonen, P. C. (2004).
Working memory is (almost) perfectly predicted by g. Intelligence 32, 277–296.
doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2003.12.002
Costa, P. T. Jr., and McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four ways five factors are basic. Pers.
Individ. Dif. 13, 653–665. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(92)90236-I
Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64, 135–168. doi:
10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143750
Diamond, A., and Lee, K. (2011). Interventions shown to aid executive function
development in children 4-12 years old. Science 333, 959–964. doi: 10.1126/
science.1204529
Duckworth, A. L., and Kern, M. L. (2011). A meta-analysis of the convergent
validity of self-control measures. J. Res. Pers. 45, 259–268. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.
2011.02.004
Eigsti, I. M., Zayas, V., Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., Ayduk, O., Dadlani, M. B., et al.
(2006). Predicting cognitive control from preschool to late adolescence and
young adulthood. Psychol. Sci. 17, 478–484. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.
01732.x
Fox, L. A., Shor, R. E., and Steinman, R. J. (1971). Semantic gradients and
interference in naming color, spatial direction, and numerosity. J. Exp. Psychol.
91, 59–65. doi: 10.1037/h0031850
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Robinson, J. L., and Hewitt, J. K. (2011).
Developmental trajectories in toddlers’ self-restraint predict individual
differences in executive functions 14 years later: a behavioral
genetic analysis. Dev. Psychol. 47, 1410–1430. doi: 10.1037/a00
23750
Goff, M., and Ackerman, P. L. (1992). Personality-intelligence relations: assessment
of typical intellectual engagement. J. Educ. Psychol. 84, 537–552. doi: 10.1037/
0022-0663.84.4.537
Groborz, M., and Ne˛cka, E. (2003). Creativity and cognitive control: explorations
of generation and evaluation skills. Creat. Res. J. 15, 183–197. doi: 10.1080/
10400419.2003.9651411
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., and Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2010). Ego depletion
and the strength model of self-control: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 136,
495–525. doi: 10.1037/a0019486
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., and Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a
dual-systems perspective. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 4, 162–176. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-
6924.2009.01116.x
Hofmann, W., Schmeichel, B. J., and Baddeley, A. D. (2012). Executive
functions and self-regulation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 174–180. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2012.01.006
Inzlicht, M., and Berkman, E. T. (2015). Six questions for the resource model
of control (and some answers). Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 9, 511–524. doi:
10.1111/spc3.12200
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., and Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving fluid
intelligence with training on working memory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105,
6829–6833. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0801268105
Kotabe, H. P., and Hofmann, W. (2015). On integrating the components of
self-control. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 10, 618–638. doi: 10.1177/1745691615593382
Larson, G. E. (1986). The Mental Counters Test. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center.
Logan, G. D. (1994). “On the ability to inhibit thought and action: a user’s guide
to the stop signal paradigm,” in Inhibitory Processes in Attention, Memory, and
Language, eds D. Dagenbach and T. H. Carr (San Diego, CA: Academic Press),
189–239.
Lurquin, J. H., Michaelson, L. E., Barker, J. E., Gustavson, D. E., von Bastian, C. C.,
Carruth, N. P., et al. (2016). No evidence of the ego-depletion effect across
task charactersitics and individual differences: a pre-registered study. PLoS One
11:e0147770. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147770
McCrae, R. R. (1987). Creativity, divergent thinking, and openness to experience.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 52, 1258–1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1258
McCrae, R. R., and Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of
personality across instruments and observers. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 52, 81–90.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.81
Meijers, J., Harte, J. M., Jonker, F. A., and Meynen, G. (2015). The prison brain?
Executive dysfunction in prisoners. Front. Psychol. 6:45. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00043
Meijers, J., Harte, J. M., Meynen, G., and Cuijpers, P. (2017). Differences in
executive functioning between violent and non-violent offenders. Psychol. Med.
47, 1784–1793. doi: 10.1017/S0033291717000241
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance.
J. Exp. Psychol. 22, 1423–1442. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.22.6.1423
Mihalec, J., Bezdicek, O., Nikolai, T., Harsa, P., Jech, R., Silhan, P., et al.
(2017). A comparative study of Tower of London scoring systems and
normative data. Arch. Clin. Neuropsychol. 32, 328–338. doi: 10.1093/arclin/
acw111
Mischel, W. (1974). “Processes in delay of gratification,” in Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 7, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York, NY:
Academic Press), 249–292.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., and Peake, P. (1988). The nature of adolescent
competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
54, 687–696. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.687
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., and Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in
children. Science 244, 933–938. doi: 10.1126/science.2658056
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., and
Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their
contributions to complex “Frontal Lobe” tasks: a latent variable analysis. Cogn.
Psychol. 41, 49–100. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1999.0734
Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Belsky, D., Dickson, N., Hancox, R. J., Harrington, H.,
et al. (2011). A gradient of childhood self-control predicts health, wealth, and
public safety. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 2693–2698. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1010076108
Muraven, M., and Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited
resources: does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychol. Bull. 126, 247–259.
doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.126.2.247
Ne˛cka, E. (1998). “Learning, automaticity, and attention: an individual differences
approach,” in Learning and Individual Differences: Process, Trait, and Content
Determinants, eds W. P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen, and R. D. Roberts
(Washington, DC: American Psychological Association), 161–181.
Ne˛cka, E., Lech, B., Sobczyk, N., and S´mieja, M. (2012). How much do we know
about our own cognitive control: self-report versus performance measures of
executive control. Eur. J. Psychol. Assess. 28, 240–247. doi: 10.1027/1015-5759/
a000147
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 July 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1139
fpsyg-09-01139 July 5, 2018 Time: 19:55 # 12
Ne˛cka et al. Self-Control and Executive Functions
Ne˛cka, E., Wujcik, R., Orzechowski, J., Gruszka, A., Janik, B., Nowak, M., et al.
(2016). NAS-50 and NAS-40: new scales for the assessment of self-control.
Pol. Psychol. Bull. 47, 346–355. doi: 10.1515/ppb-2016-0041
Raven, J. C., Court, J. H., and Raven, J. (1983). Manual for Raven’s Progressive
Matrices and Vocabulary Scales (Section 4, Advanced Progressive Matrices).
London: H. K. Lewis.
Reynolds, B., Ortengren, A., Richards, J. B., and de Wit, H. (2006). Dimensions of
impulsive behavior: personality and behavioral measures. Pers. Individ. Dif. 40,
305–315. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2005.03.024
Seruca, T., and Silva, C. F. (2016). Executive functioning in criminal behavior:
differentiation between types of crime and exploring the relation between
shifting, inhibition, and anger. Int. J. Forensic Ment. Health 15, 235–246. doi:
10.1080/14999013.2016.1158755
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
298, 199–209. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1982.0082
Shipstead, Z., Redick, T. S., and Engle, R. W. (2012). Is working memory training
effective? Psychol. Bull. 138, 628–654. doi: 10.1037/a0027473
Steimke, R., Stelzel, C., Gaschler, R., Rothkirch, M., Ludwig, V. U., Paschke, L. M.,
et al. (2016). Decomposing self-control: individual differences in goal pursuit
despite interfering aversion, temptation, and distraction. Front. Psychol. 7:382.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00382
Sternberg, R. J. (2008). Increasing intelligence is possible after all. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 105, 6791–6792. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0803396105
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., and Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-
control predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and
interpersonal success. J. Pers. 72, 271–324. doi: 10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.
00263.x
Verbruggen, F., Logan, G. D., and Stevens, M. A. (2008). STOP-IT: windows
executable software for the stop-signal paradigm. Behav. Res. Methods 40,
479–483. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.2.479
Young, S. E., Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Willcutt, E. G., Corley, R. P., Haberstick,
B. C., et al. (2009). Behavioral disinhibition: liability for externalizing spectrum
disorders and its genetic and environmental relation to response inhibition
across adolescence. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 118, 117–130. doi: 10.1037/a0014657
Zawadzki, B., Strelau, J., Szczepaniak, P., and S´liwin´ska, M. (1998). Inwentarz
Osobowos´ci NEO-FFI Costy i McCrae. Adaptacja Polska. Podrêcznik [NEO-FFI
Personality Inventory by Costa and McCrae. Polish adaptation. A Manual].
Warszawa: Pracownia Testów Psychologicznych PTP.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Ne˛cka, Gruszka, Orzechowski, Nowak and Wójcik. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 July 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1139
